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Abstract
Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed
to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more
accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might
naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling
stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than
collective level. In 13 written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they
have lost confidence in one of their own published findings. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and
explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly
common among members of the broader scientific population yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue
that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is
to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction.
Keywords
self-correction, knowledge accumulation, metascience, scientific falsification, incentive structure, scientific errors
Science is often hailed as a self-correcting enterprise.
In the popular perception, scientific knowledge is
cumulative and progressively approximates truth more
accurately over time (Sismondo, 2010). However, the
degree to which science is genuinely self-correcting is
a matter of considerable debate. The truth may or may
not be revealed eventually, but errors can persist for
decades, corrections sometimes reflect lucky accidents

rather than systematic investigation and can themselves
be erroneous, and initial mistakes might give rise to
subsequent errors before they get caught (Allchin,
2015). Furthermore, even in a self-correcting scientific
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system, it remains unclear how much of the knowledge
base is credible at any given point in time (Ioannidis,
2012) given that the pace of scientific self-correction
may be far from optimal.
Usually, self-correction is construed as an outcome
of the activities of the scientific community as a whole
(i.e., collective self-correction): Watchful reviewers and
editors catch errors before studies get published, critical
readers write commentaries when they spot flaws in
somebody else’s reasoning, and replications by impartial groups of researchers allow the scientific community to update their beliefs about the likelihood that a
scientific claim is true. Far less common are cases in
which researchers publicly point out errors in their own
studies and question conclusions they have drawn
before (i.e., individual self-correction). The perceived
unlikeliness of such an event is facetiously captured in
Max Planck’s famous statement that new scientific truths
become established not because their enemies see the
light but because those enemies eventually die (Planck,
1948). However, even if individual self-correction is not
necessary for a scientific community as a whole to be
self-correcting in the long run (Mayo-Wilson et al.,
2011), we argue that it can increase the overall efficiency of the self-corrective process and thus contribute
to a more accurate scientific record.

The Value of Individual Self-Correction
The authors of a study have privileged access to details
about how the study was planned and conducted, how
the data were processed or preprocessed, and which
analyses were performed. Thus, the authors remain in
a special position to identify or confirm a variety of
procedural, theoretical, and methodological problems
that are less visible to other researchers. 1 Even when
the relevant information can in principle be accessed
from the outside, correction by the original authors
might still be associated with considerably lower costs.
For an externally instigated correction to take place,
skeptical “outsiders” who were not involved in the
research effort might have to carefully reconstruct
methodological details from a scant methods section
(for evidence that often authors’ assistance is required
to reproduce analyses, see e.g., Chang & Li, 2018; Hardwicke et al., 2018), write persuasive e-mails to get the
original authors to share the underlying data (often to
no avail; Wicherts et al., 2011), recalculate statistics
because reported values are not always accurate (e.g.,
Nuijten et al., 2016), or apply advanced statistical methods to assess evidence in the presence of distortions
such as publication bias (Carter et al., 2019).
Eventually, external investigators might resort to an
empirical replication study to clarify the matter. A

replication study can be a very costly or even impossible
endeavor. Certainly, it is inefficient when a simple selfcorrective effort by the original authors might have sufficed. Widespread individual self-correction would
obviously not eliminate the need for replication, but it
would enable researchers to make better informed
choices about whether and how to attempt replication—
more than 30 million scientific articles have been published since 1965 (Pan et al., 2018), and limited research
resources should not be expended mindlessly on
attempts to replicate everything (see also Coles et al.,
2018). In some cases, individual self-correction could
render an empirical replication study unnecessary. In
other cases, additionally disclosed information might
render an empirical replication attempt even more interesting. And in any case, full information about the
research process, including details that make the original authors doubt their claims, would help external
investigators maximize the informativeness of their replication or follow-up study.
Finally, in many areas of science, scientific correction
has become a sensitive issue often discussed with highly
charged language (Bohannon, 2014). Self-correction
could help defuse some of this conflict. A research
culture in which individual self-corrections are the
default reaction to errors or misinterpretations could
raise awareness that mistakes are a routine part of science and help separate researchers’ identities from specific findings.

The Loss-of-Confidence Project
To what extent does our research culture resemble the
self-correcting ideal, and how can we facilitate such
behavior? To address these questions and to gauge the
potential impacts of individual self-corrections, we conducted the Loss-of-Confidence Project. The effort was
born out of a discussion in the Facebook group PsychMAP following the online publication of Dana Carney’s
statement “My Position on Power Poses” (Carney, 2016).
Carney revealed new methodological details regarding
one of her previous publications and stated that she no
longer believed in the originally reported effects. Inspired
by her open disclosure, we conducted a project consisting of two parts: an open call for loss-of-confidence
statements and an anonymous online survey.
First, in our open call, we invited psychological
researchers to submit statements describing findings
that they had published and in which they had subsequently lost confidence. 2 The idea behind the initiative
was to help normalize and destigmatize individual selfcorrection while, hopefully, also rewarding authors for
exposing themselves in this way with a publication. We
invited authors in any area of psychology to contribute

Loss-of-Confidence Project
statements expressing a loss of confidence in previous
findings, subject to the following requirements:
The study in question was an empirical report of a
novel finding.
The submitting author has lost confidence in the
primary/central result of the article.
The loss of confidence occurred primarily as a result
of theoretical or methodological problems with the
study design or data analysis.
The submitting author takes responsibility for the
errors in question.
The goal was to restrict submissions to cases in
which the stigma of disclosing a loss of confidence in
previous findings would be particularly high; we therefore did not accept cases in which an author had lost
faith in a previous finding for reasons that did not
involve his or her own mistakes (e.g., because of a
series of failed replications by other researchers).
Second, to understand whether the statements
received in the first part of the project are outliers or
reflect a broader phenomenon that goes largely unreported, we carried out an online survey and asked
respondents about their experience with losses of confidence. The full list of questions asked can be found
at https://osf.io/bv48h/. The link to the survey was
posted on Facebook pages and mailing lists oriented
toward scientists (PsychMAP, Psychological Methods
Discussion Group, International Social Cognition Network, Society for Judgment and Decision Making
(SJDM), SJDM mailing list) and further promoted on
Twitter. Survey materials and anonymized data are
made available on the project’s Open Science Framework repository (https://osf.io/bv48h).

Results: Loss-of-Confidence Statements
The project was disseminated widely on social media
(resulting in around 4,700 page views of the project
website), and public commentary was overwhelmingly
positive, highlighting how individual self-correction is
aligned with perceived norms of scientific best practices. By the time we stopped the initial collection of
submissions (December 2017–July 2018), we had
received loss-of-confidence statements pertaining to six
different studies. After posting a preprint of an earlier
version of this manuscript, we reopened the collection
of statements and received seven more submissions,
some of them while finalizing the manuscript. Table 1
provides an overview of the statements we received. 3
In the following, we list all statements in alphabetical
order of the first author of the original study to which
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they pertain. Some of the statements have been abbreviated; the long versions are available at OSF (https://
osf.io/bv48h/).

Statement on Carlsson and Björklund
(2010) by Rickard Carlsson
In this study, we developed a new way to measure
mixed (in terms of warmth and competence) stereotypes with the help of the implicit association test (IAT).
In two studies, respondents took two IATs, and results
supported the predictions: Lawyers were implicitly stereotyped as competent (positive) and cold (negative)
relative to preschool teachers. In retrospect, there are
a number of issues with the reported findings. First,
there was considerable flexibility in what counted as
support for the theoretical predictions. In particular,
the statistical analysis in Study 2 tested a different
hypothesis than Study 1. This analysis was added after
peer review Round 2 and thus was definitely not predicted a priori. Later, when trying to replicate the
reported analysis from Study 1 on the data from Study
2, I found that only one of the two effects reported in
Study 1 could be successfully replicated. Second, when
we tried to establish the convergent and discriminant
validity of the IATs by correlating them with explicit
measures, we committed the fallacy of taking a nonsignificant effect in an underpowered test as evidence for
the null hypothesis, which in this case implied discriminant validity. Third, in Study 1, participants actually took a third IAT that measured general attitudes
toward the groups. This IAT was not disclosed in the
manuscript and was highly correlated with both the competence and the warmth IAT. Hence, it would have complicated our narrative and undermined the claim that we
had developed a completely new measure. Fourth, data
from an undisclosed behavioral measure were collected
but never entered into data set or analyzed because I
made a judgment that it was invalid based on debriefing
of the participants. In conclusion, in this 2010 article, I
claimed to have developed a way to measure mixed
stereotypes of warmth and competence with the IAT. I
am no longer confident in this finding.

Statement on Chabris and Hamilton
(1992) by Christopher F. Chabris
This article reported a divided-visual-field (DVF) experiment showing that the skilled pattern recognition that
chess masters perform when seeing a chess game situation was performed faster and more accurately when the
stimuli were presented briefly in the left visual field, and
thus first reached the right hemisphere of the brain, than
when the stimuli were presented in the right field. The
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Table 1. Overview of the Loss-of-Confidence Statements
Authors
Carlsson and
Björklund (2010)
Chabris and
Hamilton (1992)
Fisher et al. (2015)
Heyman et al. (2015)

Lucas and Diener
(2001)
Schmukle et al.
(2007)
Silberzahn and
Uhlmann (2013)
Smith and Zentall
(2016)

Strand et al. (2018)

Vazire (2010)
Willén and Strömwall
(2012)
Witt and Proffitt
(2008)
Yarkoni et al. (2005)

Title

Journal

Implicit stereotype content: Mixed stereotypes
can be measured with the implicit
association test
Hemispheric specialization for skilled
perceptual organization by chessmasters
Women’s preference for attractive makeup
tracks changes in their salivary testosterone
The influence of working memory load on
semantic priming
Understanding extraverts’ enjoyment of social
situations: The importance of pleasantness
Second to fourth digit ratios and the implicit
gender self-concept
It pays to be Herr Kaiser: Germans with
noble-sounding surnames more often work
as managers than as employees
Suboptimal choice in pigeons: Choice
is primarily based on the value of the
conditioned reinforcer rather than overall
reinforcement rate
Talking points: A modulating circle reduces
listening effort without improving speech
recognition
Who knows what about a person? The selfother knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model
Offenders’ lies and truths: An evaluation of
the supreme court of Sweden’s criteria for
credibility assessment
Action-specific influences on distance
perception: A role for motor simulation
Prefrontal brain activity predicts temporally
extended decision-making behavior

JIF

Citations

Social Psychology

1.36

74

Neuropsychologia

2.87

28

Psychological Science

4.90

9

Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning,
Memory and Cognition
Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology
Personality and Individual
Differences
Psychological Science

2.67

51

5.92

220

2.00

20

4.90

28

Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Animal Learning
and Cognition

2.03

64

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

3.70

9

Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology
Psychology Crime & Law

5.92

740

1.46

19

2.94

252

2.15

45

Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance
Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior

Note: JIF = 2018 journal impact factor according to InCites Journal Citation Reports. Citations are according to Google Scholar on April 27, 2019.

sample was large for a study of highly skilled performers
(16 chess masters), but we analyzed the data in many
different ways and reported the result that was most
favorable. Most critically, we tried different rules for
removing outlier trials and picked one that was uncommon but led to results consistent with our hypothesis.
Nowadays, I would analyze these types of data using
more justifiable rules and preregister the rules I was planning to use (among other things) to avoid this problem.
For these reasons, I no longer think that the results provide sufficient support for the claims that the right hemisphere is more important than the left for chess expertise
and for skilled visual pattern recognition. These claims
may be true, but not because of our experiment.
Two other relevant things happened with this article.
First, we submitted a manuscript describing two related

experiments. We were asked to remove the original
Experiment 1 because the p value for the critical
hypothesis test was below .10 but not below .05. We
complied with this request. We were also asked by one
reviewer to run approximately 10 additional analyses
of the data. We did not comply with this—instead, we
wrote to the editor and explained that doing so many
different analyses of the same data set would invalidate
the p values. The editor agreed. This is evidence that
the dangers of multiple testing were not exactly
unknown as far back as the early 1990s. The sacrificed
Experiment 1 became a chapter of my PhD thesis. I
tried to replicate it several years later, but I could not
recruit enough chess master participants. Having also
lost some faith in the DVF methodology, I put that data
in the “file drawer” for good.

Loss-of-Confidence Project

Statement on Fisher et al. (2015)
by Ben Jones and Lisa M. DeBruine
The article reported that women’s preferences for wearing makeup that was rated by other people as being
particularly attractive were stronger in test sessions in
which salivary testosterone was high than in test sessions in which salivary testosterone was relatively low.
Not long after publication, we were contacted by a
colleague who had planned to use the open data and
analysis code from our article for a workshop on mixed
effect models. They expressed some concerns about
how our main analysis had been set up. Their main
concern was that our model did not include random
slopes for key within-subjects variables (makeup attractiveness and testosterone). Having looked into this issue
over a couple of days, we agreed that not including
random slopes typically increases false positive rates
and that in the case of our study, the key effect for our
interpretation was no longer significant. To minimize
misleading other researchers, we contacted the journal
immediately and asked to retract the article. Although
this was clearly an unfortunate situation, it highlights
the importance of open data and analysis code for
allowing mistakes to be quickly recognized and the
scientific record corrected accordingly.

Statement on Heyman et al. (2015)
by Tom Heyman
The goal of the study was to assess whether the processes that presumably underlie semantic priming
effects are automatic in the sense that they are capacity
free. For instance, one of the most well-known mechanisms is spreading activation, which entails that the
prime (e.g., cat) preactivates related concepts (e.g.,
dog), thus resulting in a head start. To disentangle prospective processes—those initiated on presentation of
the prime, such as spreading activation—from retrospective processes—those initiated on presentation of
the target—three different types of stimuli were selected.
On the basis of previously gathered word association
data, we used symmetrically associated word pairs (e.g.,
cat–dog; both prime and target elicit one another) as
well as asymmetrically associated pairs in the forward
direction (e.g., panda–bear; the prime elicits the target
but not vice versa) and in the backward direction (e.g.,
bear–panda; the target elicits the prime but not vice
versa). However, I now believe that this manipulation
was not successful in teasing apart prospective and
retrospective processes. Critically, the three types of
stimuli do not solely differ in terms of their presumed
prime–target association. That is, I overlooked a number of confounding variables, for one because a priori
matching attempts did not take regression effects into

5
account (for more details, see supplementary statement
at https://osf.io/bv48h/). Unfortunately, this undercuts
the validity of the study’s central claim.

Statement on Lucas and Diener (2001)
by Richard E. Lucas
The article reported three studies that examined the
types of situations that extraverts enjoy. Our goal was
to assess whether—as intuition and some models of
personality might suggest—extraverts are defined by
their enjoyment of social situations or whether extraverts are actually more responsive to the pleasantness
of situations regardless of whether these are social. We
concluded that extraversion correlated more strongly
with ratings of pleasant situations than unpleasant situations but not more strongly with social situations than
nonsocial situations once pleasantness was taken into
account. There are two primary reasons why I have lost
confidence in this result. First, the sample sizes are
simply too small for the effect sizes one should expect
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). I do not remember how
our sample size decisions were made, and the sample
sizes vary substantially across studies even though the
design was essentially the same. This is especially
important given that one important effect from the third
and largest study would not have been significant with
the sample sizes used in Studies 1 and 2. We did report
an internal meta-analysis, but I have become convinced
that these procedures cannot correct for other problematic research practices (Vosgerau et al., 2019). Second, many participants were excluded from our final
analyses. Two participants were excluded because they
were outliers who strongly affected the results. We were
transparent about this and reported analyses with and
without these outliers. However, the results with the
outliers included do not support our hypothesis. We
also excluded a second group because their results
seemed to indicate that they had misinterpreted the
instructions. I still find our explanation compelling, and
it may indeed be correct. However, I believe that the
appropriate step would be to rerun the study with new
procedures that could prevent this misunderstanding.
Because we would never have been motivated to look
for signs that participants misunderstood the instructions if the results had turned out the way we wanted
in the first place, this is an additional researcher degree
of freedom that can lead to unreplicable results.

Statement on Schmukle et al. (2007)
by Stefan C. Schmukle
The original main finding was that the implicit gender
self-concept measured with the IAT significantly correlated with second-digit/fourth digit (2D:4D) ratios for
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men (r = .36, p = .02) but not for women. We used two
different versions of a gender IAT in this study (one
with pictures and one with words as gender-specific
stimuli; r = .46), and we had two different 2D:4D measures (the first measure was based on directly measuring the finger lengths using a caliper, and the second
was based on measuring the scans of the hands; r =
.83). The correlation between IAT and 2D:4D was, however, significant only for the combination of picture IAT
and 2D:4D scan measure but insignificant for other
combinations of IAT and 2D:4D measures. When I was
writing the manuscript, I thought that the pattern of
results made sense because (a) the research suggested
that for an IAT, pictures were better suited as stimuli
than words and because (b) I assumed that the scan
measures should lead to better results for psychometric
reasons (because measurements were averaged across
two raters). Accordingly, I reported only the results for
the combination of picture IAT and 2D:4D scan measure
in the article (for all results, see the long version of the
loss-of-confidence statement at https://osf.io/bv48h/).
In the meantime, I have lost confidence in this finding,
and I now think that the positive association between
the gender IAT and 2D:4D is very likely a false-positive
result because I should have corrected the p value for
multiple testing.

Statement on Silberzahn and
Uhlmann (2013) by Raphael
Silberzahn and Eric Uhlmann
In 2013, we published an article providing evidence
that the meaning of a person’s name might affect the
person’s career outcomes. In a large archival data set
with more than 200,000 observations, we found that
German professionals with noble-sounding last names
such as Kaiser (“emperor”), König (“king”), and Fürst
(“prince”) were more often found as managers compared with German people with common, ordinary last
names such as Koch (“cook”) or Bauer (“farmer”). We
applied what we believed to be a solid statistical
approach, using generalized estimating equations first,
and during the review process applied hierarchical linear modeling and controlled for various potential third
variables, including linear controls for name frequency.
A postpublication reanalysis by Uri Simonsohn using
an expanded version of our data set identified a curvilinear name-frequency confound in the data, whereas
we had used only linear controls. Applying the improved
matched-names analysis to the larger data set conclusively overturned the original article’s conclusions. Germans with noble and nonnoble names are equally well
represented in managerial positions. We subsequently

coauthored a collaborative commentary (Silberzahn
et al., 2014) reporting the new results. This experience
inspired us to pursue our line of work on crowdsourcing data analysis, in which the same data set is distributed to many different analysts to test the same
hypothesis and the effect-size estimates are compared
(Silberzahn et al., 2018; Silberzahn & Uhlmann, 2015).

Statement on Smith and Zentall
(2016) by Thomas R. Zentall
We have found, paradoxically, that pigeons are indifferent between a signaled 50% reinforcement alternative
(leading half of the time to a stimulus that signals 100%
reinforcement and otherwise to a stimulus that signals
0% reinforcement) over a guaranteed 100% reinforcement alternative. We concluded that the value of the
signal for reinforcement (100% in both cases) determines choice and, curiously, that the signal for the
absence of reinforcement has no negative value. More
recently, however, using a similar design but involving
extended training, we found that there was actually a
significant preference for the 50% signaled reinforcement alternative over the 100% reinforcement alternative (Case & Zentall, 2018). This finding required that
we acknowledge that there is an additional mechanism
involved: the contrast between what was expected and
what was obtained (positive contrast). In the case of
the 50% reinforcement alternative, 50% reinforcement
was expected, but on half of the trials, a signal indicated that 100% reinforcement would be obtained (“elation,” analogous to the emotion felt by a gambler who
hits the jackpot). Choice of the 100% reinforcement
alternative comes with an expectation of 100% reinforcement, and because 100% reinforcement is obtained,
there is no positive contrast and no elation. The recognition of our error in not acknowledging that positive
contrast has led to a better understanding of the motivation that gamblers have to gamble in the face of
repeated losses and occasional wins.

Statement on Strand et al. (2018)
by Julia Strand
The article reported that when participants listened to
spoken words in noise, the cognitive resources necessary to understand the speech (referred to as “listening
effort”) were reduced when the speech was accompanied by dynamic visual stimulus—a circle that modulated with the amplitude of the speech. When attempting
to replicate and extend that work, I discovered an error
in the original stimulus presentation program that was
responsible for the observed effect. The listening-effort
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task we used was based on response time, so the critical comparison was participant response times in conditions with and without the visual stimulus. There was
an unintentional delay set in the timer of the condition
without the visual stimulus, leading to artificially slowed
response times in that condition. We contacted the journal, and they invited us to submit a replacement article.
Given that the timing delay affected every observation
for one condition in a systematic way, it was straightforward to reanalyze the data and present the results
as they would have been without the error. The original
article was not retracted but now links to the new
article (Strand et al., 2020) that presents the corrected
results.

Statement on Vazire (2010)
by Simine Vazire
In this article, I suggested a model in which selfreports are more accurate than peer reports for traits
that are low in observability and low in evaluativeness,
whereas peer reports are more accurate than selfreports for traits that are high in observability and high
in evaluativeness. The main issue was that I ran many
more analyses than I reported, and I cherry-picked
which results to report. This is basically p-hacking,
but because most of my results were not statistically
significant, I did not quite successfully p-hack by the
strict definition. Still, I cherry-picked the results that
made the contrast between self-accuracy and peer
accuracy the most striking and that fit with the story
about evaluativeness and observability. That story was
created post hoc and chosen after I had seen the pattern of results.

Statement on Willén and Strömwall
(2012) by Rebecca M. Willén
In this study, I evaluated the criteria used by Swedish
courts for assessing credibility of plaintiffs’ accounts.
The main reasons for my loss of confidence in the
results reported are listed below.
First, the main coder (myself) was not blind to the
veracity of the statements. In addition, the main coder
had also conducted the interviews, which means that
she might have been influenced by the memory of
nonverbal cues that were not supposed to have influenced the codings. The second coder was blind and
did indeed come to different conclusions in his codings.
These differences may have been a consequence of the
conditions and nonverbal cues being known to the
main coder, and this possibility remained undisclosed
in the article.
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Second, all four hypotheses described as confirmatory in the introduction of the article were in fact not
formalized until after the data had been collected. It
could be argued that the first three hypotheses were
“obvious” and thereby implicitly already decided on.
The fourth hypothesis, however, was far from obvious,
and it was the result of exploratory analyses made by
myself.
Finally, no gender differences were predicted, and
gender was never planned to be analyzed at all. The
gender findings are thus the result of exploratory analyses. This fact is, however, never made very explicit;
instead, these unexpected results are highlighted even
in the abstract.
That said, I do think there is reason to believe that
one particular main finding is worth trying to replicate:
“False and truthful confessions by 30 offenders were
analyzed, and few significant effects were obtained.”
That is, true and false statements by criminally experienced offenders might be more difficult to distinguish
than true and false statements provided by the typical
participants in deception and interrogation research
(i.e., undergraduates without criminal experience).

Statement on Witt and Proffitt (2008)
by Jessica K. Witt
The article reported that squeezing a rubber ball interferes with the processes necessary for the perceiver’s
ability to reach to a target to affect perceived distance
to the target (Experiment 3a). Participants judged the
distance to targets that were beyond the reach of the
arm, then picked up a conductor’s baton and reached
to them. One group of participants applied a constant,
firm pressure on a rubber ball while making their distance judgments, and another group did not. There are
two primary flaws that cast doubt on the findings. One
concerns the methodology. The sample sizes were
small, so statistical power was likely to be quite low.
The other concern regards the statistical analysis. The
analysis reported in the article used an incorrectly
specified model. Specifically, we calculated the mean
estimated distance for each participant at each distance
for a total of 10 estimates per participant, then analyzed
these means as if they were independent observations.
This inflated the degrees of freedom, which resulted in
lower p values. When the data are analyzed correctly,
the statistical significance of the critical effect of ball
squeeze on estimated distance depends on whether or
not an outlier is removed (for full results, see long version of the loss-of-confidence statement at https://osf
.io/bv48h/). Model misspecification and low sample sizes
also applied to Experiments 1, 2, and 3b. For Experiment 1,
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when the data are analyzed correctly, statistical significance depends on the exclusion of two outliers. For
Experiment 2, the critical effect of tool condition was
not significant; no outliers were identified. There were
only 4 participants per condition, making the experimental outcomes inconclusive. For Experiment 3b, the
article originally reported a null effect; upon reanalysis,
the effect was still null. Experiment 4 is believed to
have been analyzed correctly on the basis of the
reported degrees of freedom, but those data have been
lost and therefore cannot be confirmed. With such low
statistical power, little confidence can be had that the
reported data support the idea that squeezing a ball
can interfere with the effect of tool use on estimated
distance.

Statement on Yarkoni et al. (2005)
by Tal Yarkoni
This study used a dynamic decision-making task to
investigate the neural correlates of temporally extended
decision-making. The central claim was that activation
in areas of right lateral prefrontal cortex strongly and
selectively predicted choice behavior in two different
conditions; peak between-subjects brain-behavior correlations were around r = .75. I now think most of the
conclusions drawn in this article were absurd on their
face. My understanding of statistics has improved a bit
since writing the article, and it is now abundantly clear
to me that (a) I p-hacked to a considerable degree (e.g.,
the choice of cluster thresholds was essentially arbitrary) and that (b) because of the “winner’s curse,”
statistically significant effect sizes from underpowered
studies cannot be taken at face value (see Yarkoni,
2009). Beyond these methodological problems, I also
now think the kinds of theoretical explanations I proposed in the article were ludicrous in their simplicity
and naivete—so the results would have told us essentially nothing even if they were statistically sound (see
Meehl, 1967, 1990).

Discussion of the Loss-of-Confidence
Statements
The studies for which we received statements spanned
a wide range of psychological domains (stereotypes,
working memory, auditory perception, visual cognition,
face perception, personality and well-being, biologically driven individual differences, social cognition,
decision-making in nonhuman animals, deception
detection) and employed a diverse range of methods
(cognitive tasks, implicit and explicit individual differences measures, archival data analyses, semistructured
interviews, functional MRI), demonstrating the broad

relevance of our project. Overall, the respective original
articles had been cited 1,559 times as of April 27, 2020,
according to Google Scholar, but the number of citations varied widely, from nine to 740. The reasons given
for the submitters’ loss of confidence also varied widely,
with some statements providing multiple reasons.
Broadly speaking, however, we can group the explanations into three general categories.

Methodological error
Five of the statements reported methodological errors
in the broadest sense. In three instances, submitters
( Jones & DeBruine; Silberzahn & Uhlmann; Witt) lost
confidence in their findings upon realizing that their
key results stemmed from misspecified statistical models. In those three cases, the submitters discovered, after
publication, that a more appropriate model specification resulted in the key effect becoming statistically
nonsignificant. In another instance, Carlsson reported
that upon reconsideration, two studies included in his
article actually tested different hypotheses—a reanalysis
testing the same hypotheses in Study 2 actually failed
to fully support the findings from Study 1. Finally,
Strand lost confidence when she found out that a programming error invalidated her findings.

Invalid inference
Four of the statements reported invalid inferences in
the broadest sense. In two cases (Heyman and Yarkoni),
the submitters attributed their loss of confidence to
problems of validity—that is, to a discrepancy between
what the reported results actually showed (a statistically
significant effect of some manipulation or measure) and
what the article claimed to show (a general relationship
between two latent constructs). In a similar vein, Zentall
lost confidence in a conclusion when a follow-up
experiment revealed that an extension of the experimental procedures suggested that the original mechanism was not sufficient to account for the phenomenon.
Although the latter loss-of-confidence statement might
be closest to normative assumptions about how science
advances—new empirical insights lead to a revision of
past conclusions—it also raises interesting questions:
At what point should researchers lose confidence in a
methodological decision made in one study based on
the results of other studies that are, in principle, also
fallible?

p-hacking
Seven of the statements (Carlsson, Chabris, Lucas, Yarkoni,
Schmukle, Vazire, and Willén) reported some form of
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p-hacking—specifically, failing to properly account for
researcher degrees of freedom when conducting or
reporting the analyses. We hasten to emphasize that our
usage of “p-hacking” here does not imply any willful
attempt to mislead. Indeed, some of the submitters
noted that the problems in question stemmed from their
poor (at the time) understanding of relevant statistical
considerations. The statement by Lucas also highlights
how subtle researcher degrees of freedom can affect
analyses: Although the justification for a specific exclusion criterion still seems compelling, the researcher
would not have been motivated to double-check data
points if the desired results had emerged in the initial
analysis.

Results and Discussion of the
Anonymous Online Survey
Overall, 316 scientists completed the survey. Most (93%)
reported being affiliated with a university or a research
institute, and all career stages from graduate students
to tenured professors were represented. We did not
limit the survey to particular fields of research but
asked respondents to indicate their department (if
applicable); 43% did not report a department, 37%
worked at a psychology department, and the remaining
respondents were distributed over a broad range of
fields (e.g., business, economics, medicine). Almost all
respondents reported working either in Europe (44%)
or the United States (47%). Figure 1 provides an overview of the survey results.
Almost half of the respondents (44%) reported losing
confidence in at least one of their findings. Another
14% were not sure whether they had lost confidence
according to our definition for a variety of reasons. For
example, some reported that their confidence in one
of their own research articles was low to begin with;
some had lost confidence in their theoretical explanation but not in the general effect—or conversely, in the
effect but not in the theory; others doubted whether
their results would generalize to other contexts. Respondents who reported losing confidence were then asked
to elaborate on the case for which they felt most
responsible.4 Of the respondents who stated that they
had experienced a loss of confidence, more than half
(56%) said that it was due to a mistake or shortcoming
in judgment on the part of the researchers, and roughly
one in four (28%) took primary responsibility for the
error.
Strikingly, the primary reason indicated for a loss of
confidence was self-admitted questionable research
practices (e.g., p-hacking and selective reporting; 52%).
However, a broad variety of other reasons were also
reported. The loss of confidence was a matter of public
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record in fewer than a fifth of the reported cases (17%),
and if it was a matter of public record, the outlets primarily chosen (statement in later publication, conference presentation, social media posting) were not
directly linked to the original research article. Respondents whose loss of confidence was not public reported
multiple reasons for the lack of disclosure. Many felt
insufficiently sure about the loss of confidence to proceed (68%). Some stated the belief that public disclosure was unnecessary because the finding had not
attracted much attention (46%), expressed concerns
about hurting the feelings of coauthors (33%), or cited
the lack of an appropriate venue (25%), uncertainty
about how to best communicate the matter (25%), and
worries about how the loss of confidence would be
perceived (24%).
On the whole, these survey results suggest a nuanced
view of losses of confidence. Researchers may start to
question their own findings for a broad variety of reasons, and different factors may then keep them from
publicly disclosing this information. Collectively, the
responses suggest that a sizeable proportion of active
researchers has lost confidence in at least one of their
findings—often because of a recognized error of their
own commission.
Note that our respondents do not constitute a representative sample of researchers. Furthermore, estimating article-level rather than researcher-level loss of
confidence requires assumptions and extrapolations. 5
Thus, caution should be exercised when interpreting
the specific numerical estimates reported here. Nevertheless, one can attempt a very conservative extrapolation: More than 1 million academic articles are currently
published each year ( Jinha, 2010). Supposing that at
least a third of these are empirical research reports, and
that even just 1% of these reports are affected, that still
leaves thousands of articles published each year that
will eventually lose the confidence of at least some of
their authors—often because of known errors yet typically without any public disclosure.

General Discussion
The Loss-of-Confidence Project raises a number of
questions about how one should interpret individual
self-corrections.
First, on a substantive level, how should one think
about published empirical studies in cases in which the
authors have explicitly expressed a loss of confidence
in the results? One intuitive view is that authors have
no privileged authority over “their” findings, and thus
such statements should have no material impact on a
reader’s evaluation. On the other hand, even if authors
lack any privileged authority over findings they initially
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Have You Ever Lost
Confidence in One of
Your Own Published
Research Articles?

Was the Loss of Confidence Due to To What Extent Do You Take Personal
Responsibility for the Mistake or
A Mistake or Shortcoming in
Shortcoming in Judgment?
Judgment on the Part of the
Researchers?
Little or No Responsibility
n = 28

Yes
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Completed
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Further Queried About
the Case for Which They
Felt Most Responsible
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Methods or
Analysis

Finding
Inconsistent
With Other
Evidence

Other Reason

Fig. 1. An overview of the findings from the loss-of-confidence survey.

reported, they clearly often have privileged access to
relevant information. This is particularly salient for the
p-hacking disclosures reported in the loss-of-confidence
statements. Absent explicit statements of this kind, readers would most likely not be able to definitively identify
the stated problems in the original report. In such cases,
we think it is appropriate for readers to update their
evaluations of the reported results to accommodate the
new information.

Even in cases in which a disclosure contributes no
new methodological information, one might argue that
the mere act of self-correction should be accorded a
certain weight. Authors have presumably given greater
thought to and are more aware of their own study’s
potential problems and implications than a casual
reader. The original authors may also be particularly
biased to evaluate their own studies favorably—so if
they have nonetheless lost confidence, this might
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heuristically suggest that the evidence against the original finding is particularly compelling.
Second, on a metalevel, how should one think about
the reception one’s project received? On the one hand,
one could argue that the response was about as positive
as could reasonably be expected. Given the unconventional nature of the project and the potentially high
perceived cost of public self-correction, the project
organizers ( J. M. Rohrer, C. F. Chabris, T. Yarkoni) were
initially unsure whether the project would receive any
submissions. From this perspective, even the 13 submissions we ultimately received could be considered a
clear success and a testament to the current introspective and self-critical climate in psychology.
On the other hand, the survey responses we received
suggest that the kinds of errors disclosed in the statements
are not rare. Approximately 12% of the 316 survey respondents reported losing confidence in at least one of their
articles for reasons that matched our stringent submission criteria (i.e., because of mistakes that the respondent took personal responsibility for), and nearly half
acknowledged a loss of confidence more generally.
This suggests that potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of researchers could have submitted loss-ofconfidence statements but did not do so. There are
many plausible reasons for this, including not having
heard of the project. However, we think that at least
partially, the small number of submitted statements
points to a gap between researchers’ ideals and their
actual behavior—that is, public self-correction is desirable in the abstract but difficult in practice.

Fostering a culture of self-correction
As has been seen, researchers report a variety of reasons for both their losses of confidence and their hesitation to publicly disclose a change in thinking. However,
we suggest that there is a broader underlying factor: In
the current research environment, self-correction, or
even just critical reconsideration of one’s past work, is
often disincentivized professionally. The opportunity
costs of a self-correction are high; time spent on correcting past mistakes and missteps is time that cannot
be spent on new research efforts, and the resulting
self-correction is less likely to be judged a genuine
scientific contribution. Moreover, researchers may
worry about self-correction potentially backfiring. Corrections that focus on specific elements from an earlier
study might be perceived as undermining the value of
the study as a whole, including parts that are in fact
unaffected by the error. Researchers might also fear that
a self-correction that exposes flaws in their work will
damage their reputation and perhaps even undermine
the credibility of their research record as a whole.
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To tackle these obstacles to self-correction, changes
to the research culture are necessary. Scientists make
errors (and this statement is certainly not limited to
psychological researchers; see e.g., Eisenman et al.,
2014; García-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; Salter et al., 2014;
Westra et al., 2011), and rectifying these errors is a
genuine scientific contribution—whether it is done by
a third party or the original authors. Scientific societies
could consider whether they want to more formally
acknowledge efforts by authors to correct their own
work. Confronted with researchers who publicly admit
to errors, other researchers should keep in mind that
willingness to admit error is not a reliable indicator of
propensity to commit errors—after all, errors are frequent throughout the scientific record. On the contrary,
given the potential (or perceived) costs of individual
self-corrections, public admission of error could be
taken as a credible signal that the issuer values the
correctness of the scientific record. However, ultimately,
given the ubiquity of mistakes, we believe that individual self-corrections should become a routine part of
science rather than an extraordinary occurrence.

Different media for self-correction
Unfortunately, good intentions are not enough. Even
when researchers are committed to public self-correction,
it is often far from obvious how to proceed. Sometimes,
self-correction is hindered by the inertia of journals and
publishers. For example, a recent study suggested that
many medical journals published correction letters only
after a significant delay, if at all (Goldacre et al., 2019),
and authors who tried to retract or correct their own
articles after publication have encountered delays and
reluctance from journals (e.g., Grens, 2015). Even without such obstacles, there is presently no standardized
protocol describing what steps should be taken when
a loss of confidence has occurred.
Among the participants of the Loss-of-Confidence
Project, Fisher et al. (2015) decided to retract their
article after they became aware of their misspecified
model. But researchers may often be reluctant to initiate
a retraction given that retractions occur most commonly
as a result of scientific misconduct (Fang et al., 2012)
and are therefore often associated in the public imagination with cases of deliberate fraud. To prevent this
unwelcome conflation and encourage more frequent
disclosure of errors, journals could introduce a new
label for retractions initiated by the original authors
(e.g., “Authorial Expression of Concern” or “voluntary
withdrawal”; see Alberts et al., 2015). Furthermore, an
option for authorial amendments beyond simple corrections (up to and including formal versioning of published articles) could be helpful.
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Thus, it is not at all clear that widespread adoption
of retractions would be an effective, fair, or appropriate
approach. Willén (2018) argued that retraction of articles
in which questionable research practices (QRPs) were
employed could deter researchers from being honest
about their past actions. Furthermore, retracting articles
because of QRPs known to be widespread (e.g., John
et al., 2012) could have the unintended side effect that
some researchers might naively conclude that a lack
of a retraction implies a lack of QRPs. Hence, Willén
suggested that all articles should be supplemented
by transparent retroactive disclosure statements. In
this manner, the historical research record remains
intact because information would be added rather
than removed.
Preprint servers (e.g., PsyArXiv.com) and other
online repositories already enable authors to easily disclose additional information to supplement their published articles or express their doubts. However, such
information also needs to be discoverable. Established
databases such as PubMed could add links to any relevant additional information provided by the authors.
Curate Science (curatescience.org), a new online platform dedicated to increasing the transparency of science, is currently implementing retroactive statements
that could allow researchers to disclose additional information (e.g., additional outcome measures or experimental manipulations not reported in the original
article) in a straightforward, structured manner.
Another, more radical step would be to move scientific publication entirely online and make articles
dynamic rather than static such that they can be updated
on the basis of new evidence (with the previous version
being archived) without any need for retraction (Nosek
& Bar-Anan, 2012). For example, the Living Reviews
journal series in physics by Springer Nature allows
authors to update review articles to incorporate new
developments.
The right course of action once one has decided to
self-correct will necessarily depend on the specifics of
the situation, such as the reason for the loss of confidence, publication norms that can vary between
research fields and evolve over time, and the position
that the finding takes within the wider research. For
example, a simple but consequential computational
error may warrant a full retraction, whereas a more
complex confound may warrant a more extensive commentary. In research fields in which the published
record is perceived as more definitive, a retraction may
be more appropriate than in research fields in which
published findings have a more tentative status. In addition, an error in an article that plays a rather minor role
in the context of the wider research may be sufficiently

addressed in a corrigendum, whereas an error in a
highly cited study may require a more visible medium
for the self-correction to reach all relevant actors.
That said, we think that both the scientific community and the broader public would profit if additional
details about the study, or the author’s reassessment of
it, were always made public and always closely linked
to the original article—ideally in databases and search
results as well as the publisher’s website and archival
copies. A cautionary tale illustrates the need for such
a system: In January 2018, a major German national
weekly newspaper published an article (Kara, 2018a)
that uncritically cited the findings of Silberzahn and
Uhlmann (2013). Once the journalist had been alerted
that these findings had been corrected in Silberzahn
et al. (2014), she wrote a correction to her newspaper
article that was published within less than a month of
the previous article (Kara, 2018b), demonstrating swift
journalistic self-correction and making a strong point
that any postpublication update to a scientific article
should be made clearly visible to all readers of the
original article.

Outlook
All of these measures could help to transform the cultural norms of the scientific community, bringing it
closer to the ideal of self-correction. Naturally, it is hard
to predict which ones will prove particularly fruitful,
and changing the norms of any community is a nontrivial endeavor. However, it might be encouraging to
recall that over the past few years, scientific practices
in psychology have already changed dramatically
(Nelson et al., 2018). Hence, a shift toward a culture of
self-correction may not be completely unrealistic, and
psychology, with its increasing focus on openness, may
even serve as a role model for other fields of research
to transform their practices.
Finally, it is quite possible that fears about negative
reputational consequences are exaggerated. It is unclear
whether and to what extent self-retractions actually
damage researchers’ reputations (Bishop, 2018). Recent
acts of self-correction such as those by Carney (2016),
which inspired our efforts in this project, Silberzahn
and Uhlmann (Silberzahn et al., 2014), Inzlicht (2016),
Willén (2018), and Gervais (2017) have received positive reactions from within the psychological community.
They remind us that science can advance at a faster
pace than one funeral at a time.
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Notes
1. Guidelines to promote openness (e.g., Nosek et al., 2015)
might partly reduce this asymmetry and thus make it easier for
third parties to spot flaws.
2. An archived version of the website can be found at https://web
.archive.org/web/20171212055615/https://lossofconfidence
.com/.
3. Readers are cautioned to infer nothing about original authors
who did not join or sign a loss-of-confidence statement about
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their own articles. In some cases, these authors approved of the
submission but did not get involved otherwise; in others, they
had already left the field of research.
4. Respondents who were not sure whether they had experienced a loss of confidence could also answer the follow-up
questions. However, many decided not to answer, and for those
who answered, responses are hard to interpret given the broad
variety of scenarios they were referring to. Thus, we decided
to restrict the following analyses to respondents with an unambiguous loss of confidence.
5. In the survey, we also asked researchers to indicate in how
many of their articles they had lost confidence. An analysis of
these numbers suggested that respondents had collectively lost
confidence in more than 10% of their publications in total or
more than 7% counting only those articles in which they had
lost confidence because of an error for which they took primary
responsibility. Of course, these are extrapolations based on retrospective self-reports, and we cannot assume respondents can
give perfect estimates of the relevant quantities. For this reason, a number of our key analyses focus on the respondents’
description of the one case for which they felt most responsible.
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